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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH 
RAINER F. HUCK, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14581 
ROBERT T. HAYES, 
Defendant/Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CA3E 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff to compel 
specific performance by Defendant under the terms of an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, or, in the 
alternative, for general damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable Maurice 
Harding, sitting by designation in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County. The Court, 
sitting without a jury, entered judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff ordering Defendant to assign to Plaintiff all 
of Defendant's rights, title and interest to a Salt Lake 
County house, ordering damages for loss of rents and 
attorney's fees, and ordering credits to be given to 
Defendant. (R. 139-140) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the 
lower court decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Rainer Huck takes issue with the statement 
of facts as presented by the Appellant in his brief. The 
statement omits many items essential for an understanding 
of this action and states facts which were controverted and 
in terms solely of Defendant's own evidence. For this reason, 
the findings of fact, as found by the Trial Court, shall be 
included herein with references to the transcript and exhibits 
included under each subdivision. Further facts supplementing 
these findings will be integrated into Appellant's argument. 
The Trial Court found the following facts: 
1. Defendant has been engaged in the rental and 
leasing of income property in metropolitan Salt Lake City 
for at least the past 16 years, and has acquired rental 
properties in his own name and jointly with his brother. 
(Tr. 155-157) 
2. As of March, 1974, Defendant claimed an interest 
in a house and property located at 1161 East Bueno Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Said interest was claimed by virtue 
of Defendant's assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
-3-
dated July 3, 1964, between Stanley Katz and Emma Katz, 
as sellers, and Reynold Nelson and Mary Jean Nelson, as 
buyers. (Ex. 18) 
3. In early 1974, Defendant sought to liquidate some 
of his rental properties for the purpose of raising money to 
purchase a new personal residence for Defendant. During 
this period of time, Defendant entered into a listing agree-
ment with A & B Realty Company, a licensed real estate broker, 
for the purpose of selling the property at 1161 East Bueno 
Avenue. Defendant dealt with A & B Realty through Emily 
West and Lynn Austin, agents, who were employed or engaged 
on behalf of A & B Realty to enter into leasing agreements 
for the purpose of selling property for a commission. 
(Tr. 87, 132-133, 157) 
4. On or about March 2, 1974, Plaintiff observed 
the A & B Realty "For Sale" sign placed at 1161 East Bueno 
Avenue and contacted Marcia Evans who was employed or engaged 
on behalf of A & B Realty for the purpose of buying and selling 
property. Mrs. Evans had previously assisted Plaintiff in 
the purchase of several properties during the preceding two 
years and agreed to present an offer on his behalf to the 
Defendant. (Tr. 13, 84) 
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5. Utilizing the information obtained in the multiple 
listing service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, Plaintiff 
informed Mrs. Evans of the terms and conditions upon which he 
was willing to purchase the Bueno property. Plaintiff offered 
to pay $10,600.00 total purchase price which consisted of 
$100.00 earnest money, approximately $5,500.00 on delivery of 
a deed or final contract of sale, and to assume the prior 
obligation (termed as a mortgage) of approximately $5,000.00 
with monthly payments of $75.00 to include taxes and insur-
ance. Other terms and conditions were included by Plaintiff 
which are evidenced by the Earnest Money Agreement. Plaintiff 
specifically requested that Mrs. Evans write in the date of 
March 8, 1974, as the proposed closing date of the sale. 
(Tr. 13-15, 86, 158) 
6. On or about March 3, 19 74, Mrs. Evans delivered 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase to the resi-
dence of Defendant. At this time Plaintiff's check for 
$100.00 payable to A & B Realty was attached to said Earnest 
Money Agreement and was in the exclusive control and posses-
sion of Mrs. Evans. (Tr. 87, 174; Ex. 1, 3) 
7. On or about March 3, 1974, Defendant submitted a 
counteroffer for a total sales price of $11,600.00 and executed 
his signature therein. (Tr. 87; Ex. 3) 
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8. On or about March 3, 1974, Mrs. Evans physically 
returned the Earnest Money Agreement to Plaintiff at which 
time Plaintiff made a further counteroffer of a total sales 
price of $11,100.00 and executed his signature therein. 
(Tr. 16, 87; Ex. 3) 
9. On or about March 3, 1974, Mrs. Evans again returned 
the Earnest Money Agreement to the residence of Defendant, at 
which time Defendant agreed to the terms of said second counter-
offer and affixed his signature. (Tr. 87) 
1Q. This Agreement was valid and binding upon the 
parties and was not ambiduous. (Tr. 221) 
11. On Sunday, March 3, 19 74, Mrs. Evans delivered 
the executed Earnest Money Agreement and the Plaintiff's 
check for $100.Q0 to A & B Realty. Subsequently, a receipt 
was given dated March 4, 19 74, to Plaintiff showing the $100.00 
had been deposited with A & B's trust account. (Tr. 90; Ex. 2) 
12. Between March 3, 1974 and March 7, 1974, A & B 
Realty ordered a preliminary title report from Pioneer Title 
Company. (Tr. 88, 114) 
13. On or about March 7, 1974, Mrs. Evans received 
the preliminary title report which indicated that (a) title 
to the property was in the name of Thomas H, Kirschbaum and 
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Suzanne S. Kirschbaum as joint tenants; (b) a federal tax 
I 
lien against the Defendant in the amount of $2,726.67 was 
imposed against the property; (c) excepted two previous 
warranty deeds for failure to list marital status at the 
time the deeds were executed; and (d) did not disclose what 
interest, if any, the Defendant had in the property. (Tr. 120j 
Ex. 4) 
14. On March 7, 1974, Mrs. Evans advised Defendant 
of these title problems. Defendant instructed Mrs. Evans 
to clear them as soon as possible so that a closing could 
be accomplished. She agreed and contacted the Plaintiff and 
informed him of these problems. Plaintiff concurred that she 
should attempt to clear these problems as soon as possible. 
(Tr. 89, 120) 
15. On March 8, 1974, Plaintiff had available funds 
from his father and from his own sources to make the payment 
required by the Earnest Money Agreement. Neither Defendant 
nor A & B Realty requested any payment be made at that time. 
No offer to pay the money was made by Plaintiff. (Tr. 21, 82) 
16. Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform 
his part of the Earnest Money Agreement and acted in good 
faith in attempting to close the transaction at all times. 
(Tr. 33; Ex. 5, 6, 7, 10) 
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17. On March 25, 1974, Mrs. Evans conferred with 
Defendant and his attorney, Mr. Perkins. At no time during 
said conference was Plaintiff or his agent given notice of 
Defendant's intent to abandon, waive, or rescind the Earnest 
Money Agreement. (Tr. 91, 126, 133) 
18. On April 15, 1974, at the law offices of Richard 
Perkins, a meeting was held for the purpose of closing the 
transaction. At the meeting were Defendant, Richard Perkins 
(his attorney), Lynn Austin, and Emily West, listing agents 
for A & B Realty, Plaintiff, Craig S. Cook (his attorney), 
Marcia Evans, agent for A & B Realty, and Bill Fagergren, 
broker for A & B Realty. Plaintiff was prepared to close 
the transaction pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement at 
this time. (Tr. 21, 94, 133) 
19. At said meeting, Plaintiff had checks totaling 
$5,750.00 and supplemental funds for any discrepancy and 
showed said checks to Marcia Evans and to Bill Fagergren, 
agent and broker for A & B Realty, respectively. At no time 
did Defendant or agents from A & B Realty request that this 
money be deposited with them, and Plaintiff did not offer to pay 
over the money. (Tr. .28, 63, 103, 134; Ex. 6, 7) 
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20. At the meeting it was learned that the federal 
government would not release tax liens on property for either 
90 or 120 days after a check had been deposited with the 
agency. (Tr. 101) 
21. At this meeting Plaintiff examined certain state-
ments of Defendant's account with Dr. Kirschbaum concerning 
the Bueno property and inquired why there was no showing 
that taxes and insurance had been computed into the balance 
owing to Dr. Kirschbaum. (Tr. 26f 101) 
22. It was then mutually agreed among all parties 
that the tax lien should be officially released and that 
a correct balance of Defendant's equity ih the property should 
be obtained from the banks by recomputing the taxes and insur-
ance from the previous seven years. Richard Perkins, 
Defendant's attorney, specifically stated that it would be 
impossible to close the transaction until these matters were 
concluded. (Tr. 27, 64, 102, 165) 
23. It was then mutually agreed by all the parties 
present, including Defendant and Defendant's attorney, Richard 
Perkins, that Marcia Evans should secure a release of the tax 
lien and take any steps necessary to obtain a corrected balance 
satisfactory to both Dr. Kirschbaum and Defendant. (Tr. 27, 102) 
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24. Subsequent to this meeting and sometime in the 
latter part of April, a new balance was computed by Mr. 
Stanley Katz, as authorized and agreed upon by Dr, Kirschbaum, 
which resulted in a reduction in Defendant's equity. (Tr. 103; 
Ex. 11) 
25. During the latter part of April or early May, 
Mrs. Evans informed Defendant that the tax lien had now been 
released and that a balance had been recomputed and that, 
therefore, a closing could be held at any time subject to 
his approval of the recomputed equity interest. Defendant 
informed Mrs. Evans he was not interested in closing and hung 
up the phone on her. (Tr. 103) 
26. A closing pursuant to the Earnest Money Agree-
ment could have been made during the first week of May, 1974. 
(Tr. 103) 
27. In the latter part of May, Marcia Evans again 
telephoned Defendant and informed him that a closing could be 
accomplished at any time. Defendant then informed Mrs. 
Evans that he was "out of the financial woods" and con-
sidered Plaintiff to be in default so that Defendant had no 
further obligation to comply with the Earnest Money 
Agreement. (Tr. 105) 
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28. On or about June 1, 19 74, Plaintiff attended a 
closing of his part of the transaction at the offices of 
A & B Realty with Marcia Evans and Bill Fagergren. At that 
time, Plaintiff gave A & B Realty a cashierfs check for the 
amount owing to Defendant for his equity interest in the 
amount of $5,038.32 as computed by Dr. Kirschbaum's agent, 
Stanley Katz, and adjusted to that date. (Tr. 37, 40) 
29. Plaintiff has at no time sought more than an 
assignment of Defendant's contract subject only to evidence 
of a legally enforceable claim of right to good and market-
able title at the time of executing the assignment document 
and paying the purchase price. (Tr. 70,218) 
30. The property located at 116^ Bueno Avenue has 
been rented by Defendant during the pendency of this lawsuit 
and is reasonably worth $110.00 a month in rental value from 
June 1, 19 74 to the date of this order. (Tr. 149) 
31. Reasonable attorneys' fees from the time of 
filing this Complaint to the time of this order is equal to 
$1,725.00. (Tr. 194-195) 
32. Reasonable interest to be charged against Plaintiff 
on $5,038.32 as deposited by him in his bank account is 5-1/4% 




THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ORDERING SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER 
TO PURCHASE. 
A. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
Clearly Evidenced the Intent of the Parties and was Legally 
Binding. 
Appellant Hayes throughout the trial and in his brief 
argues that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
(Fx. 3) is ambiguous and unclear and is not the true intentions 
of the parties. Such argument is completely without merit. 
The Agreement calls for the sale of the property 
located at 1161 East Bueno Avenue and states that the total 
purchase price is to be $10,600.00. It further states that 
$5,500.00 will be paid to Defendant upon delivery of "deed 
or final contract of sale" which shall be on or before March 
8/ 1974. The contract further provides that Plaintiff is to 
assume a "mortgage" of approximately $5,000.00 with monthly 
payments of $75.00 including taxes and insurance. Finally, 
the receipt states that the seller agrees to furnish "good 
and marketable title with a policy of title insurance in the 
name of the purchaser." In addition to the terms of the 
contract itself, the legend of the Agreement states "this 
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may be a legally binding form, if not understood seek other 
advice." 
Defendant has not contented at any time during these 
proceedings that the terms of this contractt are erroneous. 
That is, at the time the Agreement was entered into Defendant 
was to receive a cash-out of approximately $5,500.00 and Plaintiff 
was to assume an obligation of approximately $5,000.00. 
Defendant argues that this Agreement requires him to deliver 
a warranty deed which he cannot supply since he has a mere 
assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. The language 
quoted above refers to "final contract of sale" which allows 
for an assignment of a contractual interest. Moreover, it is 
uncontroverted that Plaintiff has never expected any more than 
an assignment of Defendant's interest in this contract and 
has specifically prepared papers of assignment and not papers 
to transfer a fee title. (Tr. 76, 136, 218-219) 
In addition, at the time the Earnest Money Agreement 
was presented to Mr. Hayes and during the entire time preceding 
this lawsuit no objection was raised by Hayes or his attorney 
that any ambiguity or error existed in the Earnest Money 
Agreement. (Tr. 127,181) Defendant Hayes testified that he con-
sulted with his attorney, Mr. Perkins, about this transaction. 
(Tr. 159-160) Hayes made no objections during the time preceding 
this lawsuit that the Earnest Money Agreement attempted to impose 
on him any conditions to which he had not already assented. As such, 
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he is in no position to claim a right to recission. Johnson 
v, Jones, 164 P.2d 893 (Utah 1946). 
Defendant also argues that he was under no obligation 
to furnish good and marketable title with a policy of title 
insurance and in fact testified that he did not know a title 
search would be made. (Tr. 158) At the same time, however, 
he testified that he did not read the "fine print" of the 
contract in which the requirement for title insurance is con-
tained. (Tr. 159) It is well settled that except in extra-
ordinary circumstances a person who, having the opportunity to 
read a contract but fails to do so is bound by the terms 
of such Agreement. Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, 234 
P.2d 842 (Utah 1951). Besides this point, the title report 
was ordered by A & B Realty which was acting as the broker 
and agent for Defendant. Obviously, Defendant's own agents 
would not have ordered such a report if it had not been 
agreed to by Defendant and was clearly indicated in the Earnest 
Money Agreement. 
For these reasons, the Earnest Money Agreement in 
itself is clearly valid and binding upon both parties. 
B. Any Delay in Performance of the Earnest Money 
Agreement Was Caused Solely by Defendant's Own Actions or Inactions. 
A review of the record will show that any delay in 
the closing of the Earnest Money Agreement was caused solely 
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by Defendant. The first delay was caused when Defendant was 
unable to produce a title report showing any chain of title to 
himself; the second delay occurred when Defendant had failed 
to properly account for the money he had been paying on his 
contract which resulted in an unascertainable balance for 
Huck to assume. 
Defendant attempts to excuse th^se delays by arguing 
(1) Plaintiff defaulted; (2) Plaintiff was unjustified in 
requiring a title report; and (3) Plaintiff should have 
tendered the amount owing to Defendant. Plaintiff would submit 
that these arguments, together with the supposed ambiguity 
of the document, were "designed to avoid a bargain regretted." 
Woodard v. Allen, 1 U.2d, 220, 265 P.2d, 398 (1953). In fact, 
if the truth be known, Defendant "turned sour on the deal" 
because he was out of the financial woods and there was no 
further point in selling. (Tr. 105, 178, Hayes Deposition 
38) 
A review of the facts in light of the evidence as 
believed by the Trial Court, reasonably support the Trial 
Court's findings and conclusions. Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 
246 (Utah 1976); Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d. 139, 478 P.2d 
327 (1970). 
First, Defendant claims that the date of March 8th 
was not subject to change or modification and that the failure 
to close by this date constituted a default and entitled 
Defendant not to sell the property to Plaintiff. Legally, 
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the Earnest Money Agreement did not mandate that the closing 
had to be by March 8, 1974. In equitable cases, time is not 
ordinarily regarded as of the essence of the contract in the 
absence of an express stipulation or an implication from the 
nature of the contract or circumstances of the case. 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d 768, Contracts, Section 332. Parties to a written 
agreement may always change its terms by oral stipulation. 
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co. 146 P.2d 284 (Utah 1946). 
Factually, the evidence showed the March 8th date 
was not absolute or unyielding. The March date was supplied by 
Mr. Huck because of his desire to rent out the property -
Hayes never expressed any definite date. (Tr. 15, 1958). 
Mrs. Evans, agent for A & B Realty, testified she called 
Hayes and told him of the title problem and he said to clear 
up the problems as quickly as possible. (Tr. 90) It is 
customary in the real estate business to postpone or delay 
closing dates for various reasons, including title deficiencies. 
Although Defendant changed his testimony on several occassions, 
he admitted that he would have closed the transaction up to 
April 15th. (Tr. 179) This conduct certainly allowed the Trial Coui 
to conclude that the date of closing had been mutually modified. 
In addition, the Trial Court found, as was justified by the 
evidence presented, that neither Defendant nor his attorney ever 
gave notice of any intent to abandon, waive, or rescind the 
Agreement because of the failure to close by March 8th. (R. 132) 
As stated previously, any delay which resulted in 
the closing of this transaction was caused solely because of 
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Defendant's inability to deliver evidence of marketable title 
and his failure to produc r ~e • _ .. \.~ .<± .-. These 
corrections were being carrier on b; /• % •? Realcy Company, 
the broker-agent of Defendant. It is therefore .: f^~ic» It 
t : I magi ne how the Trial Court cou i-; ^3™? coneI u- -^ o chat 
Plaintiff defaulted i:\ the contract by failing to close 
before the March R 
Secondly, *-~— Defendant argues that Plaintiff was 
unjustified in requesting a title report and - - --: st: - .-
upon -evidence of marketable ri^i^. Thi s argument i.° without merit. 
Line 45 and 4- : the Earnest Money Agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3) states: 
"The Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable 
title with abstract brought to date or at seller1s 
option a policy of title insurance in the name of 
the purchaser." 
The underlined p o r u u n of ** - ••-'•*•-"-.<• * .**•.- -* .< ^ 
that a policy of -^itle insurance w a ^ t- re the exciusi/e method 
of furnishing title. Defendant admitted he did not ever rp.^ -J 
thi- rrrovis • _•.-• i :iw is settled that whe - ^  
seller agrees t,c furnish marketable title, a report or abstract 
must on its face show a y . • .-; in t.n^ seller as ib t.jVLdenced 
by d chain ot conveyances " -• . Jur. 2d 426, 434, Vendor 
and Purchaser^ Sections 26 i , ,<?" .< * Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P. 2d 
867 (Cai, Apr- 1958) jor,.: -- r^ eeran, 505 P. 2d 710 (Kan, 1973). 
Defendant: relies upon the eas^s of this Court and 
other jurisdictions in which the ge---'<: r \ - -• - \.i- ec *'--.at a 
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purchaser may not recover his down-payment or seek recision 
on the ground of unmarketability of title prior to the time 
provided for delivery of the deed. Plaintiff does not dispute 
these cases nor the reasoning behind this rule. Obviously, 
a seller should be free to encumber property with an additional 
mortgage or the like during the time a buyer is making payments 
provided that at the time the warranty deed is to be executed 
the encumbrances have been removed. However, this is not the 
case in the present situation and comes within an exception 
to this rule. It has been stated: 
"An exception is made in the case of misrepresenta-
tions of the title by the seller, particularly if the 
encumbrances revealed are relatively substantial or 
if the seller is wholly lacking in title. A dis-
tinction is drawn between the implied promise that 
a marketable title will be conveyed in the future 
and a breach of a representation or warranty that 
certain facts exist presently. In case of a breach 
of a latter, the purchaser is not obligated to 
continue with his performance on the assumption that 
the breach will be remedied." Friedman, Contracts 
and Conveyances of Real Property, Page 313. 
(Emphasis added) 
This reasoning is in accord with the further exception that a 
buyer after having contracted with a seller is not obligated to 
make further payments if there is no possibility the seller cannot 
convey good title. American Savings and Loan Association v. 
Blomquist, 24 U.2d 35, 465 P.2d 353, 355 (1970). 
Defendant throughout this litigation has failed to 
note this distinction. In the instant case, the title report 
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s h : v ^ - - - ^  - <• ; • - ,-: :) :-"4 "* : .- '*•-.• • c h -
baum and Suzanne i. Kirschbaum (Exhibit - Defendant 
asserted that ^. r.h^  * ime of -he Earnest Money Agreement he 
showed to 2 i ^ ,.• .-ea.- ^;en^~ M S assignment of contract from 
Reynold Nelsor. t: himself. "his was disputed by Mrs. Evans 
(Tr ] .08 ) . (Exhi bit 1! 8; Tr II:
 :, • • -s nnd -i sputed , howeve. r , 
that Mrs. Evans did not obtain copies oi the assignment between 
Katz (the seller mentioned in. the Hayes assignment) and Kirsch-
baum (the holder of the fee title) until she received written 
permission from, Kirschbaum to obtain the files at Tracy~Ooi_.ns 
and Western Savi no9 (!|,y ' tfh 2 le Mrs. E1;; ? ar .: •:.";- ot 
recall the exact date she obtained this document * is evident 
that it was not until after March 18, 1974, the date of the 
letter informing ~er t-o c o m a e A-\i . -at7. ("Ex. , 
Defendant, ^r n. s ^1 or, argues that the warranty deed 
(Ex. .1 9) con/v eyi r •'.-•* ^r;: t r • o-r-: t: w i th 
the fact that Kirschbaum war receiving payments from Defendant 
evidenced marketable title in Hayes (Defendant's brief, pp. 
7-8). S'.3ch an argument is clearly without merit* The 
warranty deed itself makes no exception to the contract entered 
i>.-r ^--VA** - ., v - ... *;._._,. „.. - - •-••^ :L-- — - an assigi lee. 
iE>, ±r} There -^is . : ecordea documer - s even snowing that a con-
tract A-^ C. -atstandinc <^ n K,r^chbaum's seemingly free ann --lear fee 
title ;, - - \ vi y b-=.:--v oa^e *. r •. rs-jnrsun 
was no indication tha~ Kirschbaum recognized any right or bad 
any c - - r • •" --..* ~.- -- -• ^ ->-' - of t i I .3 e ""-v. J^ 1 y
 # 
a t the uiittc- of t;:t: Maici ot;i j - ^ e and f-vr a c o n s i d e r a b l e period 
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after this, there was no evidence of Defendant's right to claim 
any interest in the property held in fee by Dr. Kirschbaum. 
It was Defendant's position throughout the trial 
that he should have received his money whether or not he had any 
title at all. (Tr. 160-161; 187-188) Hayes testified that 
he did not know the status of his title at the time of the 
offer but merely went on good faith that things were all 
right (Tr. 183, 189) 
If a person such as Defendant wishes to purchase 
property on "good faith" then he is surely entitled to do 
so. However, as the Trial Court said in referring to obtaining 
preliminary title reports, "we have all been aware of too many 
cases where that hasn't been done and people have been sadly 
robbed of money." (.Tr. 116) 
Plaintiff's principal concern in entering into the 
contract was: "That if I perform the terms of the contract, that 
I someday would receive title." (Tr. 76) Plaintiff Huck 
never expected Hayes to convey a fee title to him after learn-
ing of Hayes' contractural interest. (Tr. 76) If anything, 
it is Huck not Hayes who has the right to complain about Hayes' 
contractual interest. As stated by the California Court: 
While a vendor may not force a defective title on-
an unwilling purchaser or compel performance while 
conditions precedent to his recovery remain for 
him to perform, he cannot defend an action for 
specific performance on the ground that his title 
is not so complete as the one he agreed to convey. 
If the vendor has any interest in the property he 
has contracted to convey, the vendee, at his option, 
may enforce the contract with respect to whatever 
interest the vendor possesses, and may also receive 
compensation for the deficiency in performance. 
Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d 867, 873 (Cal. App. 1958) 
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This Court i n Johnson v. Jones, lb4 P.zd 893 
(1946), in a case involving an Earnest Money Contract sub-
s tanti a 11y s iin,i ] ar to the • :>i Ie i n th i s case , recoqn i z ed that 
a seller is bound by the specific terms r~ the instrument 
and must fulfill such terms as furnishing an abstract showing 
marketable titl e. To say, therefore , - Defendant ax: g ties 1 ::1 I at 
Plaintiff was required to pa/ Defendant over $5,0' 00.0 0 I n 
: ,. i • * a I n t i f f c o u 1 d 1 a t e r c h a 11 e n g e 
rhe title i-r, cen or : if teen years at the conclusion of h is 
additional payments of -5>S^~„ o is clearly against logic and 
any legal precedence* 'i^.A'iiz requested no more thai I he 
was legally entitled T O XIIOV * .•£. whether Defendant had any 
sa lable interest: I n ~ •...-* - ? ny f ai i ] t i n Defendant 
being unable to supply such information must be borne by 
Defendant a] one. 
Third. Defendant argues tnat Plaintiff tailed to 
tender his money on March 8th which terminated any contractual 
First» it presumes that March - th was c f;x-c dare -.-^  -:ould 
not be changed regardless of trie uren^io-'S ^f *-^ ^ parties 
As stated previously, there wa- .-,*. — :: . .- - -• - : •- .•« - -: »• 
that this date could not be changec Hy agreement nor wer- *-.^ ere 
any ci rcumstances d i ctat ing r " * ' ': :• - s - f^ -<« " d; i un-
yielding. The deposition testimony of Hayes which was read 
into the records showed tha- Hayes had waived the March 8th 
date and was pr epared -^  •_ • on both Marcl i 25 th and Apri 1 
- 2 1 -
16th but that problems kept preventing the closing. 
(Tr. 176-178) 
It is a well-settled rule of law that the sellers 
agreement to furnish an abstract or title insurance showing 
marketable title is a condition precedent to the payment of 
any purchase price by the buyer. 77 Am. Jur. 2d 434, 
Vendor and Purchaser, Section 273; Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d 
867 (Cal. App. 1958). It is equally clear that a failure to 
make a tender may be excused or a tender may be waived and 
made unnecessary by a declaration, act, or omission of the 
person to whom tender is due. 86 C.J.S. 559, Tender Section 5. 
From the evidence before the Trial Court it was proper for 
the Court to conclude that all of the parties and their agents 
mutually agreed that the March 8th closing date would be 
postponed until evidence of marketable title could be obtained 
through the efforts of A & B Realty. It was undisputed that 
during this entire period of time including the March 8th 
date, Mr. Huck had available funds sufficient to make the 
tender had it been necessary. 
Likewise, during the April 15th attempted closing, it 
is uncontroverted that Plaintiff Huck had the funds available 
to pay to Hayes and had shown them to both the broker and 
agent of A & B Realty. This time, however, through the fault 
of Defendant it was impossible to ascertain the amount that 
was to be paid to him. Again, any required tender is excused 
where the amount depends on a balance shown by accounts which 
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are inexcessible to the party who must make the tender 
7 4 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Tender Section 4, If this were not 
enough, there wa s amp] e evidence for tl: le Tr ia 1 Coi irt to 
conclude that all parties mutually agreed that a new balance 
wc;lr. h a w *:s- * tr- computed before an^ ^,rie,? co-jli l^e ra-- '-±na, 
in ..-._-;,.. . - - • - -_ ^  ^ *^. -.: - . o . r - * e 
(Tr. 64, * . '• 
r ^  f c_ - * - „ ? r r, c : 
v. Johnson, 525 7.1: -; */:t:ah ,f^i .n th-^: argument r-:a~ 
Plaintiff dia not a^ *~ :n «-^ o - raith ov railing \^ tender 4 N-
purchase price to Defendant However, in spite of Defendants 
assertions, this case- :s readily distinguishable- First, 
i n Fischer the P] a: ., : • * : . i :.:\, I tc pay to Defendants 
$ 3,000.00 at the time Defendants approved the sale. Obviously, 
there was no concurrent condit ion or conditions precedent 
after such approval. Here, the Defendant was ob] igateci to 
furnish evidence of marketable title before a tender was 
required. 
Second, the Court found that the Plaintiffs were 
net prepared to tender and did not tender the $3/000.00 pre-
it jjih _te to er-* - r * ; n ..o the coi ltract. 5 "iirtheriiioi: e, the 
Plaintiffs did not indicate they had available the $75,000.00 
whi ch was to be pa i d i ipon the execi 11i oi i o f the contrac t In 
this casef however, the evidence is uncontroverted that 
Plaintiff at all times had the available funds to pay to 
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Defendant and was, in fact, fully prepared to pay him on 
March 8th and April 15th. There is no evidence whatsoever 
in this record that the Plaintiff did not attempt with rea-
sonable diligence and good faith to do what he was required 
to do. See also Groobman v. Kirk, 323 P.2d 867, 869 (Cal. 
App. 1958) ("It should be noted that there is uncontradicted 
evidence that at all times during the period of the escrow, 
buyer was in a financial position to make the final deposit 
of $24,500.00") 
For the preceding reasons, the arguments advanced 
by Defendant must fail. The Trial Court correctly followed 
the legal precedence in cases such as this and applied it to 
the facts. In the absence of legal error Defendant's only 
other ground for relief is that the facts were unsupported 
by evidence. This too must fail. 
POINT II 
A REVIEW OF THE RECORD IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND 
THE CREDABILITY OF THE WITNESSES REASONABLY SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS. 
This Court in the case of* Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 
246 (Utah 1976) made the following statement which is analagous 
to the arguments raised by Defendant in his brief: 
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In appealing this case, Brady se^ms to enjoin 
this Court with a principle to the effect that 
the evidence should be reviewed by taking as 
true everything he aduced, to the exclusion 
of any evidence admitted at the beheast of 
his opponents, irrespective of its weight/ 
credibility, or admissibility - to which 
thesis we cannot prescribe. 546 P.2d at 24 8. 
^ * I'he Findings oi .Fact are Amply Supported by 
the Evidence* 
Defendant makes numerous complaints about specific 
findings ot luf entered by t ht Trial C nirt (D^ f . Hrit t 
pp. 10-17) Finding No, 5 is obi acted to since it states: 
"Plamtitf specif icdll; request M(f that Mrs. Evans write in t±ie 
date of March ft, 197 4 as the proposed closing date or the 
sale. " Obviously , it the time the offei was marie, the date 
could only be proposed since Hayes eoul I always refuse and 
change the date to his own likinq. Regardless of the initial 
writing, as discussed supia, this ilafe ws mutually extended 
by both parties in vievv of the circumstances of t^e closing. 
Fmdinq W 10 is attacked on the grounds that 
the agreement was ambiguous and was not valid ml tindina 
upon the parties. As dicussed previously, the agreement 
ib '(ear i i ' if I ( nil *n<1 o deniarn hds ever been made 
by Plaintiff requiring Defendant to convey an interest which 
he does not have. In addition, Defendant had ample opportun-
ity to change the teririb r i the conti ie ' <»t ( J object in h^p^ i 
but never raised these defenses until after litigation. 
Th> quoted I tjstjmjrn' 'oncf rrn nq H^/PS1 efforts to show A & B 
Realtors what interest he bad (Del Brief p. 12) only shows 
again that any mistakes made were made by Hayes * own agents 
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and are attributable to Defendant. Finally, Defendant argues 
that while the offer was not binding or valid because of its 
ambiguity, Plaintiff still had an obligation to tender money on 
or before March 8th. (Def. Brief p. 13) Clearly, if Defendant 
had no obligation to convey, then Plaintiff had no obligation 
to tender. 
Finding No. 14 is consistent with the testimony of 
Mrs. Evans (Tr. 90, 120). Even the Defendant stated that 
Mrs. Evans may have called him but he could not recall speci-
fically the substance of any phone call. (Tr. 183) It is 
highly unlikely that an agent working for A & B Realty 
Company, the listing and selling firm, would not notify both 
parties why a closing would not be accomplished on the date 
of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
The 16th finding of fact is completely supported by 
the record in that there is no evidence cited by the Defendant 
showing that Plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of 
the Agreement and was acting in good faith at all times. 
The 17th finding of fact concerned one of the major 
differences at the trial. Defendant contended at various 
times in the pleadings and at the trial that a meeting was 
held on March 25th to close the transaction. This, of course, 
is inconsistent with Defendant's other statements throughout 
the pleadings and proceedings that he considered a default 
to have taken place as of March 8th and that all further 
meetings were for the purpose of renegotiating. (Tr. 162, 184) 
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Thus, in on-= ^:^-z:\ u^iepza : • Tr^>— ::. J •-. a •.: t:\v_ -. .-r.--
on March 8th and in the other breath states that Plaintiff 
£ a i 1 ed to s how i ip f o i: t h e c 2 o s i n g o i i Ma r c h 2 51h a t wh i c h t ime 
the default noti ce was given. 
This evidence was specifdeal ** controverted h* i'*-
Plainti r: „• . - - . - *-...*-.. *. t ; , - . 
date '^r . - ^arc*- Evans testified tnat she *>az net <*.' 
av w ^irue contemplate*- - closing *:.. <1, LI 5, I I * , , '-*->. 
Evans specifically den ^  e^ ^"-? >^ar:n'~* any conversation with 
regar„ • „ . :<^. , _ : , **. , - - -srkins ii i 1 :i is testi -
mony r^: - a,xl *v..iLair- Pagergren, the broker In charge 
of • ' ' ? • * L.. fc ' - • . ~ r:emp] ated c.] osi ng i n 
March of 197 4 i?r. ii'S** 
Thus, while the testimony given by v:x Perkins as 
ci ted :i n Defendant f s brief (Pages ] 5 , ] 6) i s ^ont rar y to 
the 17th finding of fact, the Trial Court chose not to 
be ] 1 ev e t h i s t e s t i mo ny • a nd i n s 1: : e ad r e 1 i e d u po n 11 i e c o n t r ad : - - o r y 
evidence offered by Plaintiff. 
Finally, Defendant attacks f:i ndings No, 22 and No. 23 
co? \< ^ r r »i i \a the mu t A ia] a a t -r—:-^ . .: eac hed: a I the coi ICIUSJ oi i of the 
April J5tn meeting. This finding is a] so amply supported by 
the evidence (Tr. 27, 64, 102, 165). Even Defendant recalled 
Perkins saying something to the effect that the figures had to 
be recomputed. (Tr. 165) 
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Thus, all of the disputed findings raised by Defendant 
in his brief have ample evidence to support them and the Trial 
Court did not abuse his discretion in making such findings. 
B. The Credibility of Defendant at Trial Was 
Highly Questionable. 
One last point should be observed concerning the 
findings by the Trial Court. Throughout the litigation and 
during the trial itself the credibility of Defendant left 
much to be desired. A few examples should suffice to show that 
the Trial Court had ample reason to believe the Plaintiff's 
version of the transactions as compared to Defendant. First, 
Defendant attempted to change the testimony of his 
deposition taken on February 1, 1975. The following was read 
into the record at trial: 
Question: (By Mr. Cook) Ok. Directing your 
attention to page 41, line 10 you will note the 
question Mr. Perkins asked you on cross-examination 
at that time was, "after the date of March 8th, 
1974, did you feel any obligation under the Earnest 
Money?" 
The original answer in the deposition was as 
follows: "Well, a little leeway, you know. I can 
see where people would run into a week or ten 
days, something, that sort of thing. But when it 
runned into over two months, I just couldn't reason 
that out. It just was beyond me to comprehend 
somebody taking that long to close a real estate 
deal." 
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Now, you crossed that out and you wrote 
"No. I always considered Huck in default under 
the Earnest Money Agreement after March 8, 1974. 
If I hadn't felt he was in default* T would have 
sold or closed the sale." Can you ^ ell us why you 
changed that answer? 
A. Well, you are going up there and sometimes 
you are not thinking things clearly. We didn't 
rehearse or anything when we went up for that 
deposition. We went right straight into your office, 
and like I say, I didn't reason things out. 
(Tr. 162) (emphasis added) 
ica a /^::::ed answer 
to the Amended Complaint. "L-s Answer swcrr. vc inder oath 
was in direct contradiction cu t^ r- iep^s; •  : ^ n *: e •- v Lmon} becai lse 
the arr idavit states that both parties had decided tic 
waive, abandon and rescind the agreement. A further, I ncon-
s;itx^r -. - - • «.-:"tf; ur, -:.- -i*.-_' :;e ^atf--: that 
the April 15th meeting was to close fh< original Earnest Money 
Agreement w h i l e i n txie a f f i d a * • •• -r :wed \'r.- - — \ ~* M a s 
tor the purpose of re-negotiating a new Earnest Money Agreement, 
These inconsistencies ran b<p better seen in the "Memorandum 
Su ppc *- - ) f P 1 c. * ' - . . r \ . f - : z - sr. s . : je: e n c a n ' 3 
Verified Answer to the .Amended Complaint,*' <R< 6 1-66" . 
As to the affidavit itself. %^f^^,:,. .-,.,..-
that ne na.: never seen it before •'"•: . , oB) . Finally, after. 
showing Defendant his signature he admi tted signing *-!-.*=• document 
bu -. could not remember whether he had i" ear 
upon being asked specifically as to what terms "fail L: accurately 
be represented by this Earnest Money Agreement" as s'.^ - -
the affidavit, Defendant could think of none (Tr. 170-171). 
Likewise, upon being asked upon what he based his information 
that Plaintiff and Defendant had both agreed to rescind the 
contract, Defendant replied that he knew nothing that the 
Plaintiff had done to indicate his Agreement. (Tr. 172-173) 
Finally, Hayes ended up disclaiming the entire affidavit: 
A: Is that - now, what are you reading from, 
the deposition? 
Q: (By Mr. Cook) I am reading from this, your 
verified answer. 
A: I didnft prepare that, so again, you are getting 
off the track. 
Q: Do you normally sign things under oath and not 
read them? 
A: Man, I am telling you, when you are under the 
pressure I was, you might do alot of things that 
might be irrational. 
Q: So, will you want to then disavow this entire 
verified answer, say you don't know anything about 
it? 
A: I would have to. 
(172) 
The testimony concerning the March 25th and April 
15th meetings are extremely contradictory. At first, when 
asked what the purpose of the alleged March 25th meeting was 
Hayes stated that he attended "to see what she had to offer". 
(Tr. 175) Shortly thereafter, he was read his deposition testimony 
where he stated: 
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Q: What was your intention on going to that 
meeting that day? 
A: Getting the money. 
Or Closing :-ie transaction ? 
A: Thau's what I thought it wasj set up for. 
Upon the conclusion r.f the reading of his 'deposition the 
following dialogue occurred: 
Q: (By Mr. Cook) Now, Mr. Hayes, are you saying this 
deposition is incorrect, that you weren't intending 
to close the transactions on March 25th ;: April 15th? 
A: I didn't say that at all. Every t h: --o .,ou -.a nave 
to be ok'd by Mr. Perkins. 
- Q: But if Mr. Perkins had okfd it, would you have 
closed under this Earnest Money Agreement? 
*• Wei L, -;hat goes without saying. 
Well, say it. Would you have closed? 
Finally, i n an attempt to rehabilitate th$ witness, Defendant's 
counsel asked the following questions: 
Q: (By Mr. Schwobe) Did yo'i intend to do any more 
negotiating regarding title problems, etc? 
A: I went down - I wanted to see just what -
let them bring me the deal, see what they had. 
'j DIG you intend to close strictly to the terms 
c f r-^at Agreement? 
A: It. would have tx be subject to my counsel's 
approval. I wasn't ::oinc to sign anything. 
Q: Did you :^ . an Agreement by 
March 25th? 
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A: No. I considered them in default on March 
8 th. 
(Tr. 184) (emphasis added) 
Even the testimony of Richard Perkins, Defendant's 
attorney, supports his earlier deposition version of the story 
that he attended the March 25th meeting for the purpose of 
closing from the original Earnest Money Agreement. Mr. Perkins 
stated: 
Mr. Hayes called me for the purpose of asking if 
I could review some contracts, documents, which 
we had in his possession on a proposed sale on 
a home at this particular address and indicated 
that it was his desire to sell the property, that 
we were to meet with the real estate agents and 
the broker for that particular purpose. (Tr. 202) 
Later Mr. Perkins testified as follows: 
I went back to my office and worked on other matters 
for approximately 45 minutes. I came back out into 
the waiting room where Mr. Hayes was sitting and also 
Mrs. Evans. I says, "Bob," I says, "I've got other 
commitments and thing to do. Are we going to have 
the closing? What's going on?" (Tr. 204) (emphasis 
added) 
Defendant's own version of the March 25th meeting was 
highly contradictory. As can be seen, in the early part of 
his testimony such as at the deposition, he stated that the 
purpose of the alleged meeting was to close the Earnest Money 
Agreement as written. However, upon trial and consistent 
with his new defense Defendant's attornies have formulated, 
Defendant testified that he considered a default to have 
occurred on March 8th and that he was only there for the 
purpose of negotiating a further deal on March 25th. Even this 
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testimony was inconsistent and repeatedly reverted to the 
original "closing" story. 
His testimony concerning the April 15th meeting is 
equally contradicting. 
During trial, Hayes was specifically asked by 
Plaintiff's counsel the purpose of the April 15th meeting. 
The following dialogue occurred: 
Q: When you went to this meeting, did you expect 
that you could receive a higher amount than you 
had originally contracted for? 
A: I just went down to see what they were going 
to offer. 
Q: So you didn't believe there was any amount due 
and owing under this contract at that time; is that 
right? 
A: I believed it to be in default. 
Q: I see. 
A: I think I have stated that seven times now. 
(Tr. 166) (emphasis added) 
At his deposition previously, however, Hayes stated 
that he was prepared to close under the terms of the old 
Agreement. He stated in his deposition: 
By that time, I was starting to turn sour on the 
deal because I was getting up to the time limit 
on my own thing here. 
Q: Ok. Now, had the title been clear on that day, 
on April 16th, and Mr. Huck had the money for you, 
would you have closed it on that date? 
A: Uh-huh. 
(Tr. 178) (emphasis added) 
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Then, in direct contradiction of his previous trial 
testimony (Tr. 166) he changed his testimony after having 
heard the deposition read to him. 
Q: (By Mr. Cook) Now, Mr. Hayes, are you saying 
that this deposition is incorrect, that you weren't 
intending on closing the transactions on March 
25th or April 15th? 
A: I didn't say that at all. Everything would 
have to be ok'd by Mr. Perkins. 
Q: But if Mr. Perkins had ok'd it, would you 
have closed under this Earnest Money Agreement? 
A: Well, that goes without saying. 
Q: Well, say it. Would you have closed? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. 179) 
The above testimony clearly indicates that the credi-
bility of Mr. Hayes could be seriously questioned. 
The Trial Court was able to observe the witnesses, 
their demeanor, and their sincerity. The Trial Court carefully 
considered the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
evidenced by the amendment of the original findings after 
conference with both attorneys. (R. 110-123; 129-140) 
Plaintiff submits that a review of the facts as 
adduced under the rules of admissability and competency will 
reasonably support the Trial Court's findings and conclusions 
and that this Court must accordingly affirm. Brady v. Fausett, 
546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976). 
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CONCLUSION 
A review of the record including the testimony at 
trial and the exhibits offered by both parties reveal that 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid and binding 
Earnest Money Agreement for the sale of the Bueno property. 
The record further reveals that Defendant had neglected 
through the years to insure that he had an interest in the 
property which was marketable and such neglect caused a 
substantial delay in the contemplated closing of the 
Agreement. The evidence is also clear that the agents of 
Defendant, A & B Realty, together with Plaintiff acted in 
good faith in an attempt to meet the problems created by 
Defendant's neglect. The record shows that the closing of 
the original Earnest Money Agreement would have taken place 
on April 15th but for the failure of Defendant to properly 
account for the equity balance which was due to him. The 
record also shows that the parties mutually agreed that 
this balance had to be computed before any money could be 
exchanged. 
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In addition, the record is quite clear that when 
Defendant found himself not in need of the proceeds of 
this sale, he unilaterally decided to cancel the deal. 
Obviously, this is not a sufficient reason to rescind a 
contractual agreement. 
Finally, the record shows that the defenses 
relied upon by Defendant were after-thoughts used to 
justify his decision not to sell. The record shows that 
the trial court had ample reason to believe Plaintiff's 
version of the transaction and to disbelieve the contra-
dictory testimony of Defendant. The record further shows 
that there is ample evidence and legal precedent to support 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the accompanying judgment. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court 
was correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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